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The topic I want to address in this paper is "Modern Hostage
Taking and the Sins of Multiculturalism". The phrase ',Sins
of Multiculturalism" is inspired by an article of the famous
multiculturalist philosopher Michael walzer (b. tg3s).In the ear-ly
days of the Rushdie Affair, i.e. in 1989, Walzer wrote an article
under the title "The Sins of Salman".i In my view, the article by
Walzer is a highly ambivalent piece of commentary on the death
verdict issued by the Iranian cleric and poiitician Ayatolah
Khomeini on Salman Rushdie. With "ambivalent" I mean that even
after careful study it is hard to determine what walzer is trying to
say about the Rushdie Affair. Of course, he does not support the
death verdict (fatwa) on Rushdie, but he does not present a forcefur
defense of freedom of speech either.
My aim is not to make moral commentary on this stance (at
least nbt in this paper). What I want to do, is trying to understand
this phenomenon from a sociological, psychological and
cultural perspective. In my view; the ambivalence we find in the
I Walzer, Michael, "The Sins of Salman", in: The New Republic, April 10,
1989, pp. 13-15.
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commentary of walzer,is interesting. Not ail intellectuals, but asubstantial number had great dificuities in supporting Rushdie.
What fascinates T: ¡!, why? Why did very *.ñ_.ãu.u,.¿,liberal, democratic and thñule oflu* supporting inteilectuars have
so much difficulties in upholding free speech? And what has thatto do, if anything, with multicult"urahsÅi
Primøfacie this is a very idiosyncratic interest and not worthy
of a presentation on u .orrf.r.r.e like this. But my claim is, that
as soon as you delve into the subject it appears huge. And myworking hypothesis is thar this reructarr..-io defend"free ,f"".h
has something to with "multiculturarism". or, inspired by wårzer,s
title, with the "sins of Multiculturalism,,.
., No*: this was a spoiler, in a sense, because now you know what
the conclusion is' But because this conclusion may raise eyebrows
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The fatwa
It is an interesting thought experiment to ask what year, what
Í^i",.ii the history books ãf th"iot,rre will figure prominently.we all have had those dates, years, inculcatecl during our history
lessons' End of the second wo¿a war: 1945. French Revolution:
1789. What are those dates f<rr thefuturehistory books?
My bets are on 19g9. Two hundred y.urc after the French
Revolution. This was trre year of the fall, 1989, of the Berrin wail,which marked the en'd of communism as a world historicarphenomenon. But it was also the year in which 
"r, "ggr.rri* n.*icleology presenred itself (to th. p,rbli. at rarge, 
"t 
l.ö. i;rJpor.to call lt: radicøl Islamism.
- .Khomeiní'sfatwawas a clear and unambiguous manifestationof that ideology. Therefore it is enlightening to quote Khomeini,s
fatwa in his own words, so that * ãu, reull"y urår, tfr. i*f*t ofthat document:
I inform all zearous Musrii,s of the worrcl that the author ofthe book entitled The Satønic Verses_which has U..., .o_pii"ã,printed, and published in opposition to Islara, ,fr. frrpfr"i ""ìthe Koran-and at those irivolved in the pubrication who wereaware of its contents, are sentenced to death.I call upon all zealous Muslims to execute them quickl¡
yhelev¡r they may be found, so that ,ro orr" else will dare toinsult the Musrim sanctities. God willing, whoever is ki'ed onthis path is a martyr.
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In addition, arlyone who has access to the author of this book but
does not possess the power to execute him should report him to
the people so that he rn-êI be punished for his actions. (Quoted
in Pipes 2010, 30-35; Pii;ïs2003,27)'z
Islamism not Islam
Radical Islamism should, as an ideology, not be confused with
the religion of Islam, as Khomeini does, apparently. Islamism
is the political ideology that derives inspiration from Islam, but
is not identical with it. We may hope that Islamism will fail in
transforming the religion of Islam into a more radical direction.
We may also hope, must hope, that in the end Islamism will be
conquered, like fascism was in 1945, or communism in 1989 was
conquered. But there are no guarantees. And more importantlywe
do not know whenwe will succeed in ihat.
To provoke your imagination: it may even be the case (and
this is a most distressing idea) that what we are witnessing toda¡
is a real "reform" of Islam. So ISiL: this is the reform of Islam.
Al Qaida: this is the reform of Islam. In others words: not in the
direction we may hope for, but in the sense that radical movements,
radical interpretations, gain the upper hand.
Lett for the sake of argument assume that Islam, i.e. the true
nature of Islam (whatever that is), may be a "religion of peace".
Then we still run the risk that the religion of peace is rapidiy being
transformed into an engine of war.
2 In "Religion and Murcler in the Middle East," Bernard Lewis writes that
Ayatollah Khomeini "knew no English and had apparently never read the no-
vei" (Lewis 2004, 105).
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Islamism as a challenge of our time
Contrary to what many western observers Ïave thought,
Islamism is fairly successful. The most recent offspring of Islamist
ideology, the so-called "Islamic State" (ISIL, ISIS) is much more
successful, from a military point to view, than we could have
dreamt several decades ago.
Modern Islamism started with the Iranian revolution in 1979,
ten years before the føtwa. This revolution was a huge success.
Nowhere it provecl possible to inaugurate a theocratic regime
(with a possible exception of Saudi-Arabia), but here, in lran, the
islamists took over and have built a regime that proved sustainable;
already for a period ofseveral decades. One ofthe great successes
of the Iranian regime was to introduce a whole new phenomenon
which I call "modern hostage taking".
That brings me to the first part of the title of my talk. This
"modern hostage taking", and its relation to "multiculturalism", is
what I hope to highlight in my ralk.
The first "modern hostage" in the sense in which I hope to
calibrate the term was Salman Rushdie. He was held hostage in
a compietely new sense. Khomeini succeeded in making Rushdie
a hostage in his own (i.e. Rushdie's) country. And the reason was
because Rushdie violated hoiy blasphemy law. Not the blasphemy
law of Engiand, but the blasphemy law of Khomeini: sharia law.
The clash between Rushdie and Khomeini was basically not
a clash of two personalities, but a clash of two worldviews. On
the one hand there is the secularist, universalist proclamation of
human rights as enshrined in modern human rights documents.
On the other hand, there is the equally universalist but definitely
non-secular worldview of the contemporary islamists. These point
of view are basically irreconcilable and in the end one will win.
40
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To get a clear picture of what is the essence of the secularist
point of view, Iet me begin by explaining what i mean with
Rushdie's violation of blasghemy law
It may be helpful to start with some legal provisions which
are relevant herc, i.e. the legal provisions safeguarding freedom of
thought and freedom of religion.
First Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
It states:
Everyone has the right to freedom ofthought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his reiigion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance. (UN General
Assembly 1948; italics added)
The freedom to change your religion or belief is also to be
found in other human rights declarations. Article 9 (Freeclom of
thought, conscience and religion) of the European Human Rights
Charter says:
Everyone has the right to freedom ofthought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to chønge his religion or
belíef and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
worship, teaching, practice and observance. (European Union
2012; italics added)
This freedom to change your religion or belief is what I want
to highlight here. In my mind, this is tremendously important.
Freedom of religion is incomplete without the freedom to change
your religion.
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Changing your leaders and
changing your religion
You may compare it to a similar phenomenon with regarcl to
democracy. Democracy is the freedom to choose your rulers. Now,
suppose you have that freedom. But suppose also that once the
rulers you have chosen will always remain there. So you choose a
ruier in his twenties who will be still there in his eighties: a Fidel
Castro type of democracy. We all have the idea, and rightly so, that
this type of democracy is not reølly democratic. Democracy as "one
man, one vote, once" is seriously lacking from a democratic point
of view. And so political theorists, like the Austrian philosopher
Karl Popper, emphasized that essential for democracy is not only
the right to vote your rulers into existence, but also to tell them
when it is time for them to go.
In constitutional thought the last dimension is associated with
the notion of "ministerial responsibility". The minister (our ruler)
can stay in power as long øs he is held in power by Pørliøment.But
once Parliament loses its faith in the minister, the minister has to go.
Something analogous we have with the freedom of religion. On
the one hand this is the possibility to choose a religion ofyour orvn
choice, but also to relinquish this religion, if you want. Freedom of
religion is incomplete without these two dimensions.
But this freedom to change your religion for another religion,
and the freedorn to change your religion for no religion at all
(so basically to become an apostøte or an atheist) is in jeopardy
nowadays. The reason is that what, in human rights language,
is called the freedom "to change your religion" is "apostas¡"
"atheism," and "heresy", according to religious terrorists. And these
apostates, atheists, or heretics are to be punished by no less than
capital punishment.
20
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If the state fails to apply this sentence, the religiously motivated
individual has to step in, and that is precisely what happens
nowadays. When the Koqgchi-brothers take their Kalashnikov's
and force their way into the editorial headquarters of Charlie
Hebdo to murder the whole editorial staff they simply execute
holy law (sharia law). And what the French cartoonists did, or
what the Danish cartoonists did before them, was violating divine
blasphemy law. The apostate, the blasphemer, or the heretic has to
be punished with death. Now, what is new to the contemporary
situation of modern hostage taking is that the islamist dictator can
make a hostage of Rushdie, the French cartoonists, the Danish
cartoonists, or whoever mây incur the wrath of the angels of
revenge of radical Islamism. In my view, this is a complete new
situation. The year 1989 has inaugurated a new era.
The success of theoterrorism
Modern religious terrorism (or "theoterrorism"), more in
particular the Islamist kind, makes it difficult, if not impossible, to
crlticize (radical) Islam (See Cliteur 2013, 15 -41; 2012, I27 -152). And
this is the most serious factor limiting religious liberty in our time.
To avoid all misunderstanding, let me say this: Fundamental
rights are not unlimited. All the rights enshrined in the European
Human Rights Charterhavetheir legal limitations. But traditionally
it is the nation-state that determines what these limitations are.
In the new predicament it is the islamist terrorist individual (like
the Kouachi-brothers, killing the cartoonists of Charlie Hebdo), or
the islamist organisations and states (like Iran in 1989 or ISiL in
our time), who decides where the limíis of free speech have to be
drawn. And the traditional punishments for blasphemy, apostas¡
heresy - they are de føcto reintroduced in modern nation-states.
So the effective limits of religious liberty are not drawn by
nation states, not by ordinary judicial tribunals, but by informal
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theoterrorist vigilante groups applying their interpretation of
religious law in the modern world. This essay tries to develop this
issue by explaining how what I call "moclern hostage-taking" has
developed.
Let me try to explain what I mean by that.
Ilostage-Taking in General
A "hostage" is a person seized and brought under the power of
another person or organization, usually in order to compel another
person or organization (including the state) to do something that
would not have been done without this compulsion. There is a
long history of political or military use of hostage-taking in which
sometimes one organization, or one state,willingþ brought certain
hostages into the power of another organization, or state, as a
guarantee of good faith, or in the observance of obligations. This
element is clearly includecl in the definition of "hostage" that we
find in The Oxford Companion to the Law:
A person, usually of importance, taken from, or surrendered by
agreement by one belligerent to another, to be held as security.
(Walker 1980,582)
The Oxford Companion gives us a good definition of what one
may charactertze as traditionøl hostage taking. For traditional
hostage taking the hostage is taken from one beiligerent camp to
another. What characterizes modern hostage taking, is that you
do not "take from" the other party someone, but you simply issue
a verdict on the hostage. And under the conditions we are living
now, i.e. in a world with open borders and radicalized believers,
the effect is the same: the person targeted is in more or less in the
same situation as if he were taken away from his country.
a1
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Modern Hostage-Taking
So "modern" hostage taking is different from the "traditional"
hostage-taking that arose in the seventies of the twentieth century
that was referred to above: the situation in which armed terrorists
kidnapped civilians to enforce their will upon the state or the
society at large.
This modern hostage-taking, in the sense in which I describe
this phenomenon, did not start, perhaps, with a master plan.
Initiall¡ people did not even understand what was happening. It
started in 1989, with the inconvenience for a writer (Rushdie) that,
supposedl¡ he would be "hidden from the public" for a few days.
It turned out differently, as we can say in hindsight.
Why Modern Hostage-Taking
Is So Effective
There are five reasons why this relatively new technique is so
effective.
First:
person targeted easy to keep in your power
First, lt does not require complicated actions to get the
person targeted in your power. If you take someone hostage in
the traditional wa¡ then you have to capture the person first and
subsequently keep him alive in some hidden place. In other words,
you have to spend money and resources on this. This is all fairly
complicated.
One of the cornplications is that the people perpetrating the
hostage-taking are working under stressful conditions. Usually
Poul Cliteur 23
they start quarrelling with their fellow criminals about what has
to happen, about the ransom to be paid, and other matters. These
quarrels make the kidnappers weaker.
A fatwa of the type that Ayatollah Khomeini issued in 1989
(our main case of "modern hostage-taking") does not have this
inconvenience for the "kidnappers." The only thing you have to
do is, from another part of the world, make the statement that will
cause all the havoc. Afterwards, you can continue with your own
business. This shows, according to Daniel Pipes (b. L949), one of
the first writers to produce a monograph on the Rushdie Affait
how easily such a "kidnapping" can be organized (See Pipes 2010,
30-35). Khomeini proceeded to summon a secretary ancl dictate
the words by which he still has the world in captive. Word which
make him, is some perverse sense, immortal.
Second:
great terrortzingeffect on the people targeted
t-lne second reason why modern hostage-taking is so effective,
is that this has a much greater terrorizing effect on the people
targeted than traditional hostage-taking, because you send a much
more frightening message to the people living in a foreign country
than you do with the traditional terrorist techniques.
An example from the UK may make this clear. Mohammed
Sidique Khan (1974-2005), one of the four suicide terrorists
responsible for the London underground bombings on7 JuIy 2005,
said, "Until we feel security you will be our targets and until you
stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of mypeople
we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now
you too will taste the reality of this situation" (BBC News 2005;
also quoted in Desai 2007,6).
This is an important passage, because it teaches us something
about the motives of theoterrorists. The aim is, appatently, to make
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people feel uncomfortable in their situation. The idea is to get the
message across that, although people may feel safe on the territory
of their own state, in fact.¡hey are not. This is very effective. The
reason why this is the case, is this: many people have the idea that
if e.g. Tercy Waite goes to Lebanon to try to secure the release of
four hostages and is subsequently seized and held captive himself
(as happened between 1987 and 1991), this gives a feeling of unease.
But this particular feeling of unease is nothing compared to the
feeling people experience when, on the territory of their own state,
they appear not to be immune from terrorist attacks and other
types of aggression. It in fact brings modern societies back to
earlier stages of development, when physical securitywas less well-
developed than is nowadays the case.3
Third:
humiliation for the country involved
Third, the modern tactic of hostage-taking is so popular with
the aggressors, because it is extremely humiliatingfor the country
(and especially the government of the country) where it occurs.
Usually people concentrate on the immediate victim: Rushdie,
Westergaard, or the DutchiGerman showmaster Rudy Carrell, who
was threatened by Khomeini two years before the Rushdie Affair
(Cliteur 2013,15-41). But we should not forget (one of the reasons
why this has a very nice cherry on top from the perspective of the
terrorist) that also "the British" and "the Danish," as a people, are
involved. As are their governments.
When inl979 the American embassy in Tehran was occupied
and sixty-six Americans were seized, this was a humiliating
experience for the United States (See Carter 1983,431ff). When in
3 Steven Pinker's The Better Angels of our Nature: Why Violence has
Declined offers a comparison of our own time with previous epochs with re-
gard to physical safety (201Ð.
Paul Cliteur ¿J
April 1980, a rescue operation was organized and failed, this only
added to the catastrophe. And when Terry waite was captured i'
Lebanon, this was, of course, a difficult situation for the government
of Great Britain. But no one (and here comes the point that I want
to make) will think that the United States is weak because it could
not forestall the taking of hostages abroad, viz. during the crisis
indicated. And nobody will reproach the British government for
not being able to maintain the civil order in Lebanon. But when a
government cannot fulfill its prirnary function, viz. to protect its
citizens on its own territory, this is a matter of grave concern. It is,
in fact, utter humiliation and-consequently-great glory for the
terrorizing agency.
Fourth:
the terrorist threat is permanent
Fourth, the modern tactic of hostage-taking is so effective,
because the victims can never know when the situation has been
terminated. In fact: there is no termination, no end. There was no
end when Khomeini died. There was no end with new declarations
of the Iranian government. In fact, there never is an end. The only
end is the natural death of Salman Rushdie, as some wistful early
commentaries pointed out.a
Suppose Khomeini had cancelled the fatwa. Then it is always
possible that there is a fanatic who remains more popish than the
pope.t And suppose the Iranian government issues a declaration
a Saramago wrote at the end of his open letter to Rushdie that he did not
know whether they would meet one day or if Rushdie would be forever forced
to live disconnected from the rest of the world (See Saramago 1992,38).That
same pessimisrn, or realism, you also find in |eremy Waldron's essay on the
matter (lValdron 1989,248,260; Waldron 1993, 134-143).
s Karima Bennoune describes this mechanism when referring to Anwar
al-Awlaki: "Anwar al-Awlaki was indeed kiiled by the U.S. government about
a year later, something I did not celebrate. unfortunatel¡ he never rescinded
26
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that, from now on, they will concentrate on another target, e.g.
not a novelist, but a politician. Would this save the target Salman
Rushdie? Not completel¡.þecause there can always be a zealous
terrorist, yiz. someone who aspires to outbid the oficial leaders
of the Iranian regime (which has now begun to grow decadent,
less ccimmitted to the cause, has it not?). That is precisely what is
characteristic of contemporary theoterrorism.
Fifth:
undermining the moral foundations
of liberal democracy
Fífth,the tactic of modern hostage-taking is also superior to
the older tactics, because with the tactic of modern hostage-taking
it proves to be much easier to stimulate a confusing debate about
the moral foundations of liberal democratic countries.
This point is at the same time the lynching-pin to the second
part of my lecture as announced: the Sins of Multiculturalism.
Multiculturalism makes us vulnerable, makes us weak, undermines
respect for the foundations of liberal democratic thought, it puts us
in a very uncomfortable situation in the struggle against aggressive
islamist terrorism, tryingto undermine democratic societies.
So basically multiculturalist intellectuals like Michael Walzer
and, as I will hope to show also Charles Taylor, put us in a very
disadvantageous position in the cultural confrontation with
Khomeini and his many contemporary followers. And with
"contemporary followers" I do not primarily refer to the Iranian
regime, but to Al Qaida Yemen or ISIL or terrorist individuals who
basically copy the technique Khomeini introduced so successfully
in 1989.
his own death list, which remains out there in cyberspace with a long half-life"
(Bennoune 2013,24).
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The successes of Islamist theoterrorism
The successes of Islamist theoterrorism are great. We may
distinguish two types of Isiamism.
One Islamism in its militarized capacity. Here we may think
of ISiL or ISIS or "Islamic State". ISIL fights a traditional war on
the territory of Syria at the moment. Although the successes of
ISIL are considerable, in the long run they will not win this war, is
my speculation. But there is another type of aggressive Islamism.
Second there is terrorist Islamism. Terrorists do not fight a
traditional war, but a guerilla warfare. This means that terrorist
individuals and organizations perpetrate attacks in European and
American capitals or smaller towns, maximizing casualties, as we
have seen in Paris in 2015, and in some câses directly aimed at the
destruction of not only human lives but constitutional principles.
The murder of the cartoonists of Charlie Hebdo was,like theføtwø
over Rushdie, not only an assault on human lives, but also an assault
on the principle of freedom of thought, freedom of expression,
freedom of religion, including the right to change religion.
So we may make a distinction between two types of attacks.
The first one is the type like the one on the Bataclan.
Theoterrorists try to make as many casualties as possible under the
ordinary citizens whose sole error is that they are French citizens
(and therefore complicit in what theoterrorists see as a war on
Islam and its believers).
The second type of attack is directed towards people like the
French cartoonists. Those cartoonists are assaulted, because they
are accused of something totally despicable and worthy of forcefui
punishment, l.e. blasphem¡ apostasy, and heresy. Theoterrorists
do not recognize freedom of religion in the sense the (Jniversal
Declaration of Human Rights or the European Humøn Rights
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charter defrne the concept, i.¿. as the right to changereligion. Islam
is, in their interpretation, a universal rerigion in the sense that
everyone can become a Mqslim, but this universal right to become
a Muslim is not accompanièd by a universal right to ielinquish the
fold. once Muslim, always a Muslim. And thãse who deiect have
to face the consequences, i.e. death.
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Part2
The Sins of Multiculturalism"
Terrorist Islamism and
multiculturalism
And this brings me to the theme (i hope not too late) of
this conference: multiculturalism. Because there is a strange,
a disconcerting, relationship between terrorist Islamism and
multiculturalism. This may surprise some of you and I want to
emphasize this is not meant as a provocation, but there is an
intricate relationship between multiculturalism and islamist
theoterrorism. Let me try to explain.
one of the curious empirical observations one can make is that
Rushdie, the Danish cartoonists, the French cartoonists and others
who incurred the wrath of terrorists have some relationship with
what one may call "multiculturalism".
What is multiculturalism?
Multiculturalism is a concept that can mean mâny things.
A fruitful distinction to start with is between descriptive
multiculturaiism and normative multiculturalism.
Descriptive multiculturalism is simply a positive or welcoming
attitude towards cultural diversity. In that sense there is nothing
wrong with multiculturalism, of course. It is important to get
this out of the way before entering into any discussion. whoever
wants to claim that cultural variet¡ in the most general sense, is an
enrichment, makes a statement that most people will agree with.
30
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In that sense we may echo Nathan Glazer's famous booktitle We're
all mult icultur ali st s now.
But there is another.s-ense in which we can choose not to be
a multiculturalist. This iîwhat I would like to call "normative
multiculturalism" or "ideological multiculturalism".
It may very well be fhe case that you like or e\¡en enjoy cultural
diversit¡ that you âre a pluralist in heart and soul, but that you still
think that multiculturalist authors like MichaelWalzer, Charles
Taylor, Bikhu Parekh and many others have given us totally wrong
advise in how to deal with diversity and cultural pluralism.
Ideological multiculturalism manifests itself in three cultural
strands. I will cali this (i) British, (ii) American and (iii) Canadian
multiculturalism.
British multiculturalism
This normative multiculturalism, according to the British
social theorist Rumy Hasan (b. IgSg), in his excellent monograph
Multiculturalism: Some Inconvenient Truths (2010) starts with the
Runnymede report, The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000).6
This is also named "The Parekh-report" after its main contributor.
Bikhu Parekh made ideological multiculturalism "cool" in the UK.
In that report Britain was characterized as a "multicultural
society". Or rather: it advised the government to declare that the
United Kingdom had become a "multicultural society". Hasan
comments: "It seemed that'multiculturalism' had taken very deep
6 Hasan, Rumy, Multiculturalism: Some Inconvenient Truths, politico's
Publishing Ltd 2010. See also: Hasan, Rum¡ "We need a 21.t century Voltaire to
fi.ght the growing power of censorship around the world", in: The Independent,
23 October 2012; Cliteur, Paul, "Multiculturalism: Some inconvenient trt¡.ths",
Review of Rumy Hasan, in: lournal of Contemporary Religion, 2012,27:2, pp.
JJ I --t-1-1-
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roots and was a fact of British life and society".T But in the years
following the publication of this report, Hasan tells us, this proved
far from reality. The report masked profound tensions in society.
As a defining moment for a growing unease with
multiculturalism he refers to the 7 luly 2005 suiðìde bombings
in London. After that, the Chair of the Commission for Radical
Equality, Trevor Phillips (b. 1953), delivered his well-publicized
speech on 22 September 2005 with the influential characterization
that we are "sleepwalking our way to segregation".
Trevor Phillips was one of the first who pointed out that
ideological multiculturalism can have adverse consequences. The
glorification of "culture" and "cultures" can lead to an uncritical
attitude towards immoral practices taking place within minority
cultures. One of the adverse consequences was that no one dared
to criticize the social segregation which was taking place.
Hasan clearþ sympathizes with Phillips as a kind whistleblower
and he indicates that his own book is meant to be a rethinking of
the debate on multiculturalism. He aims to critique thetheoretical
andphilosophicalbasis of multiculturalism, and to highlight some
of its effects in Britain.
Multiculturalists mean well, as Hasan makes clear. At the
same time it may be surmised that the multiculturalists inflicted
considerable harm to migrant communities. The conclusion that
forces itself on the reader after reading Hasan's meticulous analysis
is that multiculturalism is a grave mistake.s Nevertheless, it is a
mistake that has deep roots in western thinking. The prehistory
7 Hasan, Ibid., p. 1.
8 Nazir-Ali claims that multiculturalism still has supporters, "even thou-
gh in recent years its failings have been manifest and it has been repudiated
by the very'establishn-rent' that gave it birth". See: Nazir-Ali, Triple leopardy
for the West: Aggressíve Secularism, Radical Islamism and Multiculturalism,
Bloomsbur¡ London 2A12, ix.
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This negative attitude towards western society is also
very manifest in the American tradition of multiculturalism.
American multiculturalist theory may be framed as dominantly
anti-weternism.
It is the special merit of Arthur Herman's (b. 1956) book The
Idea of Decline in western History (1997) to make us realize that
multiculturalism has deeper roots than the 1980s when it became
prevalent in Europe. Multiculturalism in the version it became
fashionable at European universities and in circles of policymakers,
derives from American sources. If fact, European multiculturalism
is a watered-down version of an American much more radical
version.
In the book mentioned, Herman analyzes multiculturalism
as the offspring of "declinism", or the idea of the "decline of the
West". By the 1970s the idea of "decline of the West", as it had been
developed by Arnold Toynbee (iBS9-1975) and Oswald Spengler
(1880-1936), Herman writes, no longer held the attention of the
intellectuals. That did not mean, however-, the idea was left. The
French cultural pessimists reveal how declinism moved "from
being an explicit issue, as it stiil was for Toynbee and Spengler, to
an implicit one in modern critical thinking".e
Sartre, Foucault, Fanon, and their ideological offspring, such as
Gilles Deleuze, |acques Derrida, and fean-François Lyotard, were
teaching that Western institutions, Western -style rationalit¡
e Herman, Arthur, The ldea of Decline in Western History, The Free press/
Simon & Schuster, New York, London Toronto Sydney Singapore 1997,p.364.
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language, and "discourse", and even the Western image of man
himself were all a cultural dead end. And genuine freedom
came from denying or transgressing against those Western
boundaries, they proclaimed. Humanity had to look beyond the
limits modern European civilization set on the authentic self.r0
These criticisms, as well as those of Herbert Marcuse (rs98-
1979) and of the Frankfurt School, Herman writes, served as a
springboard of a new wave of anti-western and arso anti-European
ideologies.
"One of these became multiculturalism,,.rl
Multiculturalism derives its inspiration from thinkers like
WE.B. Du Bois, Marcus Garve¡ Adorno, Marcuse, the Frankfurt
school, as well as Sartre, Foucault and Franz Fanon. It teaches that:
western rationality tramples out vitalit¡ totalizes political
institutions and manifests racism, imperialism, Darwinian
nationalism and fascism. The West is a malign force in history.
"For the multiculturalist, western civilization is entirely
Zivilisqtion; there is no Kultur at its heart".r2
Further development of
American multiculturalism
Herman makes a tour d'horizon along thinkers as C. Wright
Mills (1916 -7962), Herbert Marcuse (ISgS-tgTg) and Noam
Chomsky (b. 1928) who compared the United States with the
soviet union, claiming that they were virtually indistinguishable.l3
Enslavement, racial brutaliqr, discrimination and exproitation are
all the true face of American society. W.E.B. Du Bois (186g-1963)
to Herman, Ibid., p. 364
rr Herman, rcia.,p.Zei.
12 Herman, Ibid., p. 365.
13 Herrnan, Ibid, p. 367.
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draws the conclusions from this: 'All white people, I think, are
implicated in these things so long as we participate in American
life in a normal way and.4gtempt to go on leading normal lives".ra
Reading this makes us realize that the sort of multiculturalism
we met in the r+'ork of Charles Taylor is an innocuous and soft
version. Here we have the stronger tonic.
Very important for the antiwestern views that were to become
part of multiculturalism's philosophical basis were also the ideas
bylean-Paul Sartre (1905-19S0), who had embraced FranzFanon's
(1925-196I) wretched of the earth as the new humanity of the
future.rs As Herman says: "Orientalism's noble savage reemerged
as the Third World peasant or the ghetto dweller".r6
The seventies saw the birth of the "radical chic" as "political
pilgrims"lT who travelied from Europe and America to Cuba,
Nicaragua, China and Angola to discover the virtues which Du
Bois had professed to see in Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah (1909-1972).
Fidel Castro (b. 1926) and Che Guevara (1925-1967) became cult
heroes in Saint Germain des Pres.rs
It is with this background that the proponents of
multiculturalism inveighed against the traditional idea of the
melting pot, Herman writes.re American sociologists like Witl
Herberg (1901-1977), in Protestant Catltolic lew: An Essay in
ra Du Bois, quoted in Herman, Ibid., p. 363.
rs See on Sartre also: Lév¡ Bernard-Henri, Le siècle de Sartre: Enquête
philosophi qu e, Grasset, Paris 2000.
16 Herman, Ibid., p. 370.
17 Hollander, Paul, Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western IntellectuøIs to the
Soviet Union, Chínø and Cubø, Oxford University Press, New York / Oxford
1981.
18 Sévillia, lean, Le terrorisme intellectuel de 1945 à nos jous, Perrin,
Paris 2004 (2000), pp. 60-61; Wolin, Richard, The Windfrom the East: French
Intellectuals, the Cultural Revolution, and the Legacy of the 1960's, Princeton
University Press, Princeton & Oxford 2010.
le Herman, Ibid., p. 371.
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American Religious Sociology (1955), argued that immigranrs
must retain some form of "social identification" with their ethnic
group as a matter of self-preservation.2' )onathan Kozol (b. 1936)
argued that mainstream American education for negroes meant
a "sentence to death" and it was implicitly "racist" toconform to
the standard of the majority.
Pessimism about American culture was rampant. )ames
Baldwin (r924-r9s7) thought rhat whites wourd never be able to
admit blacks to true equality because that would destroy their (the
White's) identit¡ which was, after all, constructed on the myth of
racial superiority.2r
The most formative influence of Black identity was WE.B. Du
Bois's longing for a lost community in Africa.z2 Martin Luther King
(L929-1968) was despised as an Uncle Tom.23
Not infrequently this attitude leads to condoning or even
admiration ofviolence. In a notorious passage inAdvertisementsfor
Myself (1959) Norman Mailer (1923-2007) had praised the vitalism
and the courage of hoodlums when they murder a neighborhood
store owner. The reason is simple: "For one murders not only a
weak fifty-year-old man, but an institution as well".2a Which one?
Private property! The murder would therefore not be "altogether
cowardly".
Outrageous these ideas might now seem, they were fairly
common in that time. western culture was inherently rejectionable.
Or, as Edward Said (1935-2003) proclaimed in his influenrial
20 Herman, Lbid., p. 373.
2r Herman, Ibid., p. 375.
22 Herman, Ibid., p. 376.
23 See also: Malik, Kenan, Multículturalism ønd Its Discontenfs, Seagull
Books, Calcutta 2Aß, p.38 tr.
2a Mailer, Norman, Adyertisements for Myself, New American Librar¡
New York 1960, p. 504.
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Orientølism (197S): Western culture is a culture of imperialism.25
This totally negative attitude towards Western culture brings us to
contemporary multicukuqglism which is, unfortunatel¡ infected by
many of the ideas of the older American multiculturalism.
Canadian multiculturalism:
the politics of recognition
Although contemporary multiculturalism derives inspiration
from and further develops some tenets from the American
anti-western attitude, it is much more sophisticated from a
philosophical point of view. Canadian multiculturalism starts
with an essay by the Canadian phiiosopher Charles Taylor: "The
Politics of Recognition" (1994).26 In Taylor's work elements from
both British and American multiculturalism come together. There
is the preoccupation with multi-ethnic or multicultural society that
we flnd in British multiculturalism. But there is also - although
2s Said, Edward W, Oríentalism: Western conceptions of the Orient, With a
new Afterword, Penguin Books, London 1995 (1978). See on Said: Ibn Warraq,
Defending the West: A Critique of Edward Søid's Orientølisrn, Prometheus
Books, Amherst, New York 2007. Nazir-Ali warns us not to let post-colonial
guilt "dominate the policies of today's Britain". See: Nazir-Al i, Triple leopardy
for the West: Aggressive Secularism, Radical Islamism ønd Multiculturalism,
Bloomsbury, London 20L2,p. xiv. The most sharp rejection of Said's Orientalísm
stems from Robert lrwin, an author who tries to salvage the reputation of ori-
entalists which had been wrecked by Said. Irwin writes: "To set my cards out on
the table (.,.) that book seems to me to be a work of rnalignant charlatanry in
which it is hard to distinghuish honest mistakes from wiilful misrepresentati-
ons". See: Irwin, Robert,Dangerous knowledge: Orientalism and its Discontents,
The Overlook Press, Woodstock & New York 2006.
26 Taylor, Charles, "The Politics of Recognition", in: Taylor, Charles,
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognitior, Edited and introdu-
ced by Amy Gutman, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey 1994,
pp.25-75.
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more difficult to notice - an undercurrent of anti-westernism that
we find in American multiculturalism.
Recognition
From a perspective of political influence, Taylor's work was
tremendously successful. Karl Marx founded scientific socialism.
|ohn Stuart Mill and Friedrich Hayek became great influences
on liberalism. Peter Singer's ideas on animal welfare are at the
birth of a whole new movement of animal liberation. philosophers
can have a real influence in the world in which we live (always a
comforting idea on conferences like these). And charles Taylor had
a great influence on the ideology of multiculturalism which some
countries (canada for instance) have given pride of place in their
national identities.
Taylor made multiculturalism philosophically respectable. Not
some muddle-headed well-meaning utopianism, but a full-blown
philosoph¡ derived from Hegelian metaphysics.
Taylor's main thesis is that our identity is for a considerable
part determined by our "recognition" or "non-recognition" by
others. This is a tremendously important concept: recognition. We
also find it in the title of today's conference. Taylor writes:
The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by the recognition
or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a
person or group ofpeople can suffer real damage, real distortion,
if the people or society around them mirror back to them a
confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves.
Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a
form of oppression, irnprisoning someone in a false, distorted,
and reduced mode of being.27
27 Taylor,Ibid., p. 25.
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"Non-recognition" by others cloes not only result in ..lack of
due respect", but can cause a crippling self-hatred (,,sad.dling its
victims with a crippling self-hatred").2s This had to be the basis of
a "politics of recognition" or "iclentity politics".
Three leading ideas
in the politics of recognition
In this passage quoted above, we can identify a three leading
ideas.
Flrsf, multiculturalists believe that "recognition,, is an
important need for human beings. If people are not ,,recognized,,
by others, people really suffer.
Secondly that recognition is something a human person
derives from group-membership. Multiculturarists believe in the
"groupishness" of human beings. so the multiculturalist will not
stress individual talents, e.g. the ability of suzie to pray a sonata by
Chopin, but that Amanda belongs to a group, a religious group, an
ethnic group, from which she derives his respect.
Third, especially when it comes to the culture of minority
cultures this culture is not supposed to be criticized. Doing this
is, especiallywhen criticism comes from a western critic, inflicting
a severe injustice on the members of minority cultures.
So there are some convictions coming together here. We may
cali them:
The universølity of the need for recognition thesis;
The primacy of the grgup over the individual-thesis;
Th e n o n -j u dgem e nt ali s m - the s i s
One ma¡ of course, distinguish these different theses and
judge them differently. Personally I do not have much against the
universality of the need for recognition thesis. I can understand
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that: we all need a certain appreciation for what we are, for what
we do. But this is definitely not the same as saying that the group
should have priority over the indiviclual. on the contrar¡ I think
that is a harmful idea. And I think that multiculturalists have
made a great mistake in giving the members of minority groups
recognition not for their individual achievements, but simply for
being ø member of a religious or ethnic group.
It is certainly not helping Ahmed when sophisticated
philosophers like Taylor and parekh praise Ahmed for being a
member of a religious group and they require Suzie to play the
Chopin sonata, before they praise her. It may all be well intended,
but it is a harmful in its consequences. It does not encourage
Ahmed to play the piano. Ahmed becomes an underachiever, being
lavishly praised for believing things that Tayloa parekh and no
sensible person really believes. This, in my view, is harmful.
The non-judgmental-ism thesis is even more dangerous. Non-
judgmental-ism sounds fine but all kinds of nasty practices within
religious or ethnic communities can flourish under the respectful
eye of the sophisticatecl multiculturalist.
A good example of this is the existence of the sharia councils
operating in Great Britain and where women are denied the right
of "one law for all".
But for the theme of this paper the attitude towards freedom
of speech is more important. I think that Michael Walzer, Charles
Taylor and many other contemporary intellectuals are hampered
in their assessment of the Rushclie Affair because of their
multiculturalist non-judgmentalism. They think that if Khomeini
is so obsessed with free speech and religious criticism they do not
have the right to deny him his obsessiôrT. The "Sins of Salman", to
quote Walzert essay again, were no more than that he wrote a novel
which he was perfectly authorized to do under British national law
and European Human Rights law. But multiculturalists do not
think in terms of universal human rights but in terms of religious
28 Taylor,Ibid., p. 26.
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communities. And they think Rushclie has done something
"harmful", something "disrespectful", he has "misre cognized"
Others, i.e. the supposed needs of a non-western community'
Taylor went evàn as far as that in de days after the shooting iø
Paris, when the cartoonists of Charlie Hebdo were all murdered,
he could not bring himself to a negative judgment on the
shooters. This is embarrassing, but it should also give us food
for thought on the notions involved here. Especially the elusive
term "recognition". What should be recognized, is the worth of
the individual personality. And in accordance with that worth we
should recognize a set of individual human rights, human rights
that nor the state, nor societ¡ nor the religious community may
take away from them.
